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THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE UNRESOLVED
ISSUE OF WAR CRIMES LIABILITY
Professor Kenneth A. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Gulf War is now over. Many of the issues concerning
the war have been resolved. For instance, Iraq has agreed,
among other things, to accept a 1963 border agreement with Ku-
wait, to compensate Kuwait for damages it caused during the
occupation and to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.' Fur-
thermore, the Kurdish refugee problem appears to have been re-
solved, at least for the time being.2 However, one of the major
issues that remains unresolved is the issue of war crimes
liability.
Both Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and United States
President George Bush could face possible war crimes liability:
President Hussein for planning and initiating a war of aggres-
sion against Kuwait; President Bush for the United States
bombing of an alleged civilian bomb shelter that resulted in
hundreds of deaths. However, any war crimes tribunal would
likely be patterned after the Nuremberg Tribunal. As such, only
the vanquished - President Hussein - would be prosecuted
while the victor - President Bush - would avoid such prosecu-
tion. This situation is the major flaw in the current tribunal
structure. To make war crimes tribunals more effective, a per-
manent tribunal should be established.
This Article will analyze the issue of war crimes liability. In
Part II, international law as it relates to war crimes will be dis-
cussed. Part III will analyze the potential war crimes liability of
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. An analysis, however, of only
Saddam Hussein's potential war crimes would be inadequate,
* The author is an Assistant Professor at Thurgood Marshall School of Law. His
B.A. is from the University of San Francisco, and his J.D. is from the University of
Virginia. The author would like to thank Professors David Martin, Thomas Kleven and
Corroll Robinson for reviewing this article and providing helpful comments.
1. Security Council Resolution No. 687 reprinted in 28 U.N. Chron. 6 (1991). See
also Patrick E. Tyler, Baghdad Formally Agrees to 'Unjust' U.N. Conditions for Perma-
nent Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at Al.
2. See Excerpts from Bush's News Conference: Relief Camps for Kurds in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A12.
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since there will certainly be demands to prosecute United States
President George Bush for war crimes as well. Thus, for this rea-
son and in order to illustrate the inadequacies of the present war
crimes machinery, Part IV will evaluate the potential war crimes
liability of President Bush.3 Finally, in Part V of this Article, I
will critique the international law of war crimes and provide sug-
gestions for improving it.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING WAR CRIMES LIABILITY
In order to prosecute either Presidents Hussein or Bush for
war crimes, international law requires the authority - the juris-
diction4 - to do so. Jurisdiction is based on one of five princi-
ples: one, the territoriality principle, which applies when an of-
fense occurs within the territory of the prosecuting state; two,
the nationality principle, which recognizes that jurisdiction ex-
ists when the offender is a national or resident of the prosecut-
ing state; three, the protective principle, which allows for juris-
diction where an extraterritorial act threatens interests vital to
the integrity of the prosecuting state; four, the passive personal-
ity principle, which recognizes jurisdiction where the victim is a
national of the prosecuting state; and five, the universality prin-
ciple, which holds that certain crimes are so universally con-
demned that their perpetrators are enemies of all people and
that jurisdiction may be based solely on having custody of the
perpetrator5 It was the universality principle which gave the Al-
lied Powers the authority to prosecute Nazi officials at Nurem-
3. It is possible that members of Presidents Hussein and Bush's staff would also be
liable for war crimes. Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
provides that: "The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or respon-
sible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment." Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (1945) [hereinafter Charter of the
International Military Tribunal]. However, in the interest of economy of space, this Arti-
cle will be limited to the liability of the two heads of state.
4. Jurisdiction is defined as "the authority of states to prescribe their law, to subject
persons and things to adjudication in their courts and other tribunals and to enforce
their law, both judicially and nonjudicially." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREION RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Part IV Jurisdiction and Judgments, Ch. 4 Invalidity
and Termination of Int'l Agreements Introductory Note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)].
5. See J. Martin Wagner, Note, U.S. Prosecution of Past and Future War
Criminals and Criminals Against Humanity: Proposals for Reform Based on the Cana-
dian and Australian Experience, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 887, 899-900 (1989).
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berg for war crimes' and which would give the international
community the authority to prosecute either Presidents Hussein
or Bush.
The first attempt by the international community to codify
rules of warfare began with the Hague Convention of 1907. The
Hague Convention created substantive rules of warfare, but did
not contain any enforcement provisions. This issue was resolved,
however, when the four major Allied Powers established the In-
ternational Military Tribunal (the Nuremberg Tribunal) in Nu-
remberg, Germany following World War II "for the just and
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the
European Axis."" The Nuremberg Tribunal was governed by a
Charter of the Military Tribunal (the Charter) which set out its
constitution, jurisdiction, including the definition of war crimes,
and its powers and procedures. The Charter is now a part of
international law9 as it relates to war crimes and it would be the
basis of any prosecution of Presidents Hussein or Bush.'"
Part II, Articles 6 to 13, of the Charter was its most impor-
tant part since it contained the definition of war crimes." Arti-
6. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986).
7. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land With
Annex of Regulations (1907), T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
8. The Nuremberg Tribunal was established pursuant to an agreement signed on
August 8, 1945, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of France. See Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, supra note 3.
9. International law is created in three ways: one, in the form of customary interna-
tional law; two, by international agreement; or three, by derivation from general princi-
ples common to the major legal systems of the world. Customary international law re-
sults from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation. The practice of states would include diplomatic acts and instructions
and other governmental acts and official statements of policy.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the Charter) would be consid-
ered customary international law given the fact that a majority of states have consist-
ently reaffirmed its provisions, either through United Nations resolutions or through
treaties which embody many of its provisions. See Affirmation of the Principles of Inter-
national Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I),
U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Convention Ill]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
IV].
10. The Charter would be the basis of any prosecution not only because it has be-
come international law but also because its use would eliminate any ex post facto
problems. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3.
11. Part I of the Charter Tribunal dealt with the constitution of the Nuremberg
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cle 6(a) defined crimes against the peace as follows: "[N]amely,
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggres-
sion, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
.... 12 The Nuremberg Tribunal interpreted Article 6(a) in
the Nuremberg case.'3 The Nuremberg Tribunal found that Nazi
Tribunal. Each signatory was to provide one member of the Nuremberg Tribunal and an
alternate, see Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, at Art. II;
each signatory had to be represented by its member or alternate at every session, id. at
Part I, Art. II; the members of the Nuremberg Tribunal could not be challenged for any
reason, id. at Part I, Art. HI; the members were to choose one of themselves as Presi-
dent, id. at Part I, Art. IVb; the President was to have the deciding vote in the event of a
tie on all matters except convictions and sentences, for which an affirmative vote of at
least three to one was required, id. at Part I, Art. IVc.
Part III of the Charter required each signatory to designate a Chief Prosecutor. Id.
at Part III, Art. XIV. The Chief Prosecutors were charged with the responsibility of
investigating the charges against and the prosecution of major war criminals. Id. at Part
III, Art. XIV and Art. XV. The four Chief Prosecutors were to serve as a committee to
apportion the work between themselves. Id. at Part III. In addition, the Chief Prosecu-
tors were required to prepare and present an indictment, settle the list of accused and
submit suggested rules of procedure to the Nuremberg Tribunal. Id. at Part III, Art.
XIV.
Part IV of the Charter set out certain provisions aimed at securing a fair trial for the
defendants. An indictment was to be served upon the defendants within a reasonable
time prior to trial. Id. at Part IV, Art. XVI. A preliminary examination was to be con-
ducted and the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel both at the prelimi-
nary hearing and during trial. Id. at Part IV, Art. XVI. Finally, the defendants had the
right to present evidence and to confront witnesses. Id. at Part IV, Art. XVI.
Part V dealt with the powers of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the conduct of the
trial. The Nuremberg Tribunal had the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to
interrogate the defendants and to require the production of documents and other eviden-
tiary material. Id. at Part V, Art. XVII. The Nuremberg Tribunal was not bound by
rules of evidence and could admit any evidence which it deemed to have probative value.
Id. at Part V, Art. XIX. All court proceedings and official documents were to be pro-
duced in English, French, Russian and in the language of the defendant. Id. at Part V,
Art. XXV.
Part VI of the Charter required that a judgment be issued along with the reasons on
which it was based. This judgment was to be final and not subject to review. Id. at Part
VI, Art. XXVI. Finally, the Nuremberg Tribunal was given the power to impose upon a
defendant, on conviction, any sentence which it deemed appropriate, including a death
sentence. Id. at Part V, Art. XXVII.
Of the twenty-two accused, twelve received death sentences, three received life
sentences, two were given sentences of twenty years, one a sentence of fifteen years, one
a sentence of ten years and three were acquitted. See PETER CALVOCORRESS1, NUREMBERO,
THE FACTS, THE LAW AND THE CONSEQUENCES 141 (1948) [hereinafter CALVOCORRESSI]. In
addition to the proceedings at Nuremberg, thousands of lower ranking offenders were
convicted at proceedings held througout Germany.
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, at Part II, Art.
VIa.
13. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946). An additional definition of the type of
of conduct which would constitute a violation of Article 6(a) would be Article 3 of the
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officials had "planned and waged aggressive war against twelve
nations, '14 in violation of Article 6(a). The planning of the ag-
gressive wars began with Hitler's Mein Kampf in 1925.15 Hitler's
goal was to unite the German people, whom he believed to be
superior to other races and peoples.'" This goal required two
things which "necessarily involved the seizure of foreign territo-
ries:" one, the disruption of the European order as it had existed
since the Treaty of Versailles; and two, the creation of a greater
Germany beyond the frontiers of 1914.11 War was seen to be in-
evitable or, at the very least, highly probable, if these purposes
were to be accomplished. 8
Further evidence of war planning was found in the docu-
ments of a conference held on November 5, 1937, known as the
Hoszbach minutes.' 9 During this conference, Hitler stated that
the seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was es'sen-
General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression" resolution, adopted unanimously in 1974
which defines aggression as:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the
territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State; -
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces,
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of
the conditions provided for in the agreement of any extension of their presence
in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involve-
ment therein.
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression: Report of the Working
Group, U.N.G.A Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1975).
14. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 106.
15. Id. at 86.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 88.
19. Id.
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tial.20 He stated his belief that this could be achieved "only by
way of force,"'" and that if he was still living, "then it would be
his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem not
later than 1943 to 1945. ' '22 Finally, he indicated that his plain
intention was to seize and annex Austria and Czechoslovakia as
soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself.23 Article 6(a)
was also violated when Nazi officials waged aggressive war
against twelve nations, beginning with the invasion of Austria on
March 12, 1938 and concluding with the declaration of war
against the United States on December 11, 1941.24 Finally, Arti-
cle 6(a) was violated as a result of the Nazi's waging of war in
violation of numerous international treaties.25
Article 6(b) of the Charter prohibits crimes against fighting
men and crimes against civilians as follows:
[N] amely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include, but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment
or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civil-
ian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treat-
ment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos-
tages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity.26
The Nazi officials were found to have violated Article 6(b) as a
result of: one, the order to slaughter commandos to the last man
even if they surrendered; two, the order to separate political
commissars from other Russian prisoners and shoot them; three,
the ill-treatment and murder of Russian prisoners; four, the use
of prisoners for medical experiments; five, the use of prisoners
for labor contrary to international conventions; six, the extermi-
nation of certain segments of the population, particularly Jews,
by organized mass murder; seven, the large scale deportation of
labor in Germany in the most shocking conditions; eight, the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 89.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 84-106.
25. Id. at 106-11.
Hitler had previously signed bilateral, non-aggression treaties with many of the na-
tions he attacked, including Denmark and Russia. In addition, he violated several multi-
lateral treaties which outlawed aggression, including the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, the Versailles Treaty and the Kellog-Briand Pact.
26. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, at Art. VIb.
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taking and shooting of hostages; nine, the economic exploitation
of occupied territories over and above the needs of the occupy-
ing troops; ten, the wanton devastation of towns; and eleven, the
plunder of works of art.2 7
Article 6(c) in many respects overlaps with Article 6(b). The
major distinction between 6(b) and 6(c) is that the former covers
crimes against civilians and fighting men whereas the latter cov-
ers crimes exclusively against civilians. Article 6(c) is defined by
the Charter as follows:
[N]amely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popu-
lation, before. or during the war; or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.28
Article 6(c) was not designed to cover purely domestic mat-
ters. Rather, it was designed to cover crimes, the commission of
which was in some way connected with, in anticipation of or in
furtherance of the crimes against the peace, as defined in Article
6(b).2" The best illustration of a crime of this kind is what the
Nazi officials called the "final solution of the Jewish question." 30
This persecution occurred both before and during the war, and
its purpose was to advance the Nazi war plans. 31 It is estimated
that this policy resulted in the killing of approximately six mil-
27. See CLAVOCORESSI, supra note 11, at 48.
28. CLAVOCORESSI, supra note 11, at 133; see also Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, supra note 3, at Art. VIc.
29. CLAVOCORESSI, supra note 11, at 58.
30: The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 128 (1946).
31. Id. at 127-28.
The killing of the Jews advanced Nazi war plans in two important respects. First,
the killings allowed the Nazis to confiscate the financial holdings of the Jews, which were
used to purchase armaments. Second, Nazi officials believed that the Jews were a hin-
drance to the Nazi war policy. An illustration of this belief was stated in a German For-
eign Office circular:
It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the
solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the idea
of Greater Germany, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and conse-
quence of the events of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish influence
and the destructive Jewish spirit in politics, economy and culture, paralyzed
the German people to rise again, more perhaps even than the power policy
opposition of the former enemy Allied powers of the World War.
Id. at 127.
1992]
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lion Jews. 2 Article 6 concludes with a statement that: "Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the for-
mulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to com-
mit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts per-
formed by any persons in execution of such plan. '3 3
A further interpretation of the Charter's provisions is con-
tained in the four Geneva Conventions: one, The Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field; 4 two, The Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea;35 three, The Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (the Prisoners of War
Convention);36 four, The Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the Civilian Convention).3 7
Since serious questions have been raised as to whether the latter
two conventions were violated during the Gulf War, the major
provisions of each will be discussed in greater detail.
The Prisoners of War Convention is applicable to almost all
armed conflicts.38 This Convention defines prisoners in a way
calculated to include every person likely to be captured in the
course of hostilities. 9 Full and primary accountability for the
treatment of prisoners of war falls upon the detaining power, not
upon individuals.40 The detaining power is under a general obli-
gation to treat the prisoner humanely.41 Medical and scientific
experiments are prohibited, as are reprisals for breaches of the
32. Id. at 130.
33. See infra note 42.
34. 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (1949).
35. 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1949).
36. 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950).
37. 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949). The United States, Iraq and Kuwait have ratified the
Geneva Conventions. In 1977, two additional protocols were added to fill gaps in the
Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
(T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes, 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 95, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 135, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
38. See Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 808 (1987)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW]; see also The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
39. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
40. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
41. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
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laws of war.42 Prisoners are to be treated alike, regardless of
race, nationality, religious beliefs, or political opinions.48 They
must receive maintenance and medical attention.44 Prisoners are
not subject to public curiosity or torture and may retain their
personal effects.45 Conditions at prison camps must meet certain
minimum standards. 46 Finally, the work that the prisoner is re-
quired to perform must not be inherently dangerous, humiliat-
ing, or directly connected with the operations of the war.
The Civilian Convention protects civilian inhabitants of an
occupied territory.48 In particular, the following acts are consid-
ered grave breaches of the Convention:
[W]ilfully killing, torture or inhuman treatment. . , wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, un-
lawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
protected person ... taking of hostages and extensive destruc-
tion and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.4
9
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CHARTER TO IRAQI PRESI-
DENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
In this section, President Saddam Hussein's liability under
Article 6 of the Charter and possible defenses which he might
assert will be analyzed.
One of the most serious charges against President Hussein
at a war crimes trial is that he engaged in crimes against peace
by planning, preparing, initiating and waging a war of aggression
against Kuwait in violation of Article 6(a) of the Charter. There
is an abundance of evidence which demonstrates that President
Hussein planned and prepared the attack on Kuwait. First, it is
widely known that he had been displeased with Kuwait's viola-
tions of the production quota allocated to it by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helped to
42. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
43. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
44. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 808.
45. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 809.
46. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 809.
47. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 809.
48. See Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949).
49. Id. Art. 147.
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drive down world oil prices, Iraq's primary source of revenue.50
Second, Iraq has had a long-standing border dispute with Ku-
wait, claiming that Kuwait is in fact part of Iraq. 1 Third, Iraq
faced a foreign debt of approximately sixty-five billion dollars as
a result of its war with Iran, of which about fifteen to twenty
billion was owed to Kuwait. 52 Thus, an invasion and annexation
would eliminate part of its debt and would allow Iraq to use
Kuwaiti assets to pay off the remainder of the debt.5 3 Finally,
shortly before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had moved one hun-
dred thousand troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border.54 This evi-
dence, when considered as a whole, strongly indicates that Iraq's
attack on Kuwait was premeditated, in violation of Article 6(a).
Iraq's unprovoked August 2, 1990 attack on Kuwait consti-
tuted an initiation and waging of war of aggression in violation
of Article 6(a). Article 6(a) was further violated as a result of
President Hussein's waging of war against Kuwait in violation of
two important international treaties that prohibit the use of
force in resolving disputes: one, Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter;5 and two, the 1945 Pact of the Arab League."
Similarly, President Hussein could be charged with engag-
ing in crimes against peace in the planning and preparation of
war against Israel. As a result of the threats made to attack
Israel57 prior to the Gulf War, President Hussein could also be
50. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Said to Prevail in Oil Dispute with Kuwait and
Arab Emirates, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1990, at Al.
51. See Excerpts from Iraq's Statement on Kuwait, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at
A18.
52. BARRY F. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1306 (1991) [here-
inafter CARTER & TRIMBLE].
53. Id. at 1306-07.
54. See Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait In Fierce Fight-
ing, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al.
55. Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides: "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
56. Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League states: "The Recourse to force for the
settlements of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed. . ....
Both Iraq and Kuwait are adherents to the Pact. See Pact of the League of Arab
States, 70 U.N.T.S. 248, 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. 266 (1945).
57. For instance, on September 23, 1990, Hussein issued the following statement:
We will never allow anybody, whomever he may be, to strangle the people of
Iraq, without having himself strangled. If we feel that the Iraqi people are be-
ing strangled, that there are some who will deal a sanguinary blow to it, we will
strangle all those who are the cause of this.
.. . Israel will be affected in all actions that affect the owners of the homeland
[Vol. XVIII:2
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charged with waging a war of aggression in violation of article
6(a) of the Charter and in violation of section 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter as a result of the unprovoked Scud missile at-
tacks upon Israel.55
There are several defenses which President Hussein would
be expected to raise to the charge of crimes against peace. Presi-
dent Hussein might initially assert that his actions were justified
since Kuwait was once a part of Iraq.,' Thus, Iraq was justified
in using force to reclaim Kuwait, just as the United States, for
instance, believes that it would be justified in using force to re-
claim Puerto Rico. There are, however, two problems with this
argument. First, Kuwait, unlike Puerto Rico, is recognized by
the international community as a state, and the law is clear that
states are to refrain from attacking other states.6 0 Second, and
most important, international law clearly prohibits the use of
force as a means of settling territorial disputes with other
states."6
Second, President Hussein might assert that its attacks on
Kuwait and Israel were justified as a means of forcing Israeli
compliance with United Nations resolutions concerning the Pal-
See Iraqi's Threaten to Attack Saudis and Israelis if Nation Is 'Strangled' by Embargo,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at Al.
Furthermore, during a press conference shortly before the Gulf War commenced, the
following exchange occurred:
Q. Mr. [Iraqi] Foreign Minister [Tariq Aziz], if the war starts in ... the gulf, will you
attack Israel?
A. Yes, absolutely, yes.
See Thomas L. Friedman, Baker-Aziz Talks on Gulf Fail; Fears of War Rise; Bush is
Firm; Diplomatic Effort to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al.
58. See Michael R. Gordon, Iraqis Fire Missiles at Israeli Cities after Second Day
of Allied Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at Al; Iraq Fires New Missile Attack at
Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at Al; Missile Fired at Israel, N.Y. ThiaEs, Feb. 1,
1991, at Al; Joel Brinkley, 15 Hurt in Israel as Scuds Felled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1991,
at A7.
59. Kuwait, prior to being granted independence by the British in 1961, was once
part of Basra Province in Iraq.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
61. Reaffirming the prohibition against the use of force, the General Assembly
stated: "Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the
existing international boundaries of another state or as a means of solving international
disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of states."
(Emphasis added) See Declarations of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970).
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estinian situation.62 In international law, this defense is known
as reprisals or countermeasures. A good definition of reprisals or
countermeasures was provided by a special arbitral tribunal in
the Naulilaa6 3 case:
Reprisals are acts of self-help by the injured State, acts in re-
taliation for acts contrary to international law on the part of
the offending State, which have remained unredressed after a
demand for amends. In consequence of such measures, the ob-
servance of this or that rule of international law is temporarily
suspended, in the relations between the two States. They are
limited by considerations of humanity and the rules of good
faith, applicable in the relations between States. They are ille-
gal unless they are based upon a previous act contrary to inter-
national law. They seek to impose on the offending State repa-
ration for the offense, the return to legality and the avoidance
of new offenses (emphasis added)."4
The use of reprisals or countermeasures, especially those in-
volving the use of force, has been rejected in international law
since the Naulilaa case. For instance, in the Corfu Channel
Case, 5 Albania fired on two British cruisers as they passed
through the Corfu Channel.66 Albania claimed that the British
had failed to request Albanian permission for passage through
the channel, part of which included Albanian territorial waters.6 7
The British decided to reassert their right of innocent passage
by sending a squadron of warships through the channel.6 8 While
passing through the channel, the squadron ran into a minefield
and two ships were damaged.6 9 The British navy then swept the
channel, including Albanian territorial waters, for mines.70
The International Court of Justice (the ICJ), was asked to
decide whether the British passage through Albanian territorial
62. Israel has failed to comply with numerous Security Council Resolutions, the
most important being Resolution 242, which requires Israel to withdraw its armed forces
from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and other occupied territories.
See Resolution 242, reprinted in DUSAN J. DJONORIcH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 42
(1989).
63. 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 52, at 1224.
64. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 52, at 1224.
65. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1.
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 12-13.
70. Id. at 13.
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waters was a violation of Albanian sovereignty.71 The British de-
fended their action, partially on the ground of self-help. 2 The
ICJ rejected this defense. 73 In its decision, the ICJ explained
why the international community has rejected the reprisal or
countermeasure defense:
Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular
form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would
be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead
to perverting the administration of international justice itself
•.. [.] But to ensure respect for international law, of which it
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the Brit-
ish Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.74
In addition to the Corfu Channel Case, the use of reprisals
or countermeasures has also been rejected in United Nations
resolutions. 7 5 Thus, President Hussein's assertion of reprisals as
a defense to his actions against Kuwait and Israel would be
unsuccessful.
A final defense which President Hussein might assert is eco-
nomic necessity. As discussed earlier, 6 Iraq had a large foreign
debt at the time of the invasion. However, economic necessity
has never been recognized as a defense to an unlawful use of
force.
A strong case can also be made that President Hussein has
committed war crimes in violation of Article 6(b). There exists
strong, objective evidence that Iraqi soldiers, acting on President
Hussein's behalf, committed murder and engaged in ill-treat-
ment of the Kuwaiti civilian population. This evidence is con-
tained in a report of the international human rights group, Am-
nesty International." In its report, issued in response to the
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id. at 35.
74. Id.
75. The General Assembly has stated that "States have a duty to refrain from acts
of reprisal involving the use of force." See Declaration On Principles Of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations And Co-Operations Among States In Accordance
With The Charter of The United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, October 24, 1970 (XXV 1970),
U.N. Doc. A/8082.
76. See supra note 52.
77. Amnesty International monitors the human rights practices of governments
worldwide and is independent of any government, political grouping, ideology, economic
interest or religious creed. It has formal relations with the United Nations, UNESCO,
the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States and the Organization of
African Unity.
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Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 78 Amnesty International cites: wide-
spread abuses of human rights, including the arbitrary arrest
and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and mili-
tary personnel; the widespread torture of such persons in cus-
tody; the imposition of the death penalty, and the extrajudicial
execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children;
and the fact that hundreds remain unaccounted for, having ef-
fectively "disappeared" in detention.79 According to the report,
many of those slain were killed because they carried Kuwaiti
money or refused to pledge allegiance to President Hussein.80
The report lists thirty-eight methods of torturb used by Iraqi
forces, including beatings while the victim was suspended from a
rotating ceiling fan, rape of women and young men, stubbing out
of lighted cigarettes on victims' eyeballs and tethering of victims
in the burning sun for hours without water."1
Article 6(b) may also have been violated by President Hus-
sein as a result of his nation's ill-treatment of prisoners of war.
This ill-treatment included beatings severe enough to dislodge
teeth,82 shocks with electrical wires, 3 and the public display of
P.O.W.'s on television.8 4
Finally, Article 6(b) may have been violated as a result of
Iraq's plunder of Kuwait's public and private property.85 This
included gold reserves; one billion in cash from the Kuwait Cen-
tral Bank; computers; and anything of value contained in bank
safety deposit boxes, office buildings, shopping centers, schools
and Kuwait University.' Furthermore, the Kuwait National
Museum was totally destroyed, along with its collections, which
included "one of the world's best collections of ancient Islamic
art and other items considered priceless. 87 At the Kuwait Zoo,
78. See Standoff in the Gulf; Amnesty Report Says Iraqis Tortured and Killed




82. See Michael Wines, Ex-POW's Offer Accounts of Terror and Torture In Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at Al.
83. Id.
84. See James Barron, Iraqi TV Broadcasts Interviews With 7 Identified As Allied
Pilots, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 21, 1991, at Al.
85. See Trevor Rowe, Iraq Stole $100 Billion in Goods, Kuwait Says, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 1991, at A35.
86. See Bob Drogin, In 7 Months, Iraqi's Stole 'the Very Sole' of Kuwait, L.A.




animals were either killed or removed to Iraq. 8 The estimated
one hundred billion dollar figure, however, does not include the
damage to Kuwait's oil refineries and oil fields, which occurred
as a result of fires started by Iraq,"" and the spilling of over one
million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf, which has been de-
scribed as "an ecological catastrophe of major proportions" be-
cause of the damage which has been inflicted on some sensitive
coastal eco-systems. 90
President Hussein could argue that any actions against Ku-
wait and its citizens were not war crimes, since the Charter was
not designed to apply to the purely domestic affairs of a sover-
eign state. Rather, the crimes must have occurred against other
nations or other nationals and no such crimes occurred since
Kuwait is and always has been a part of Iraq. This argument,
however, would be rejected, since Kuwait has been an indepen-
dent state since 1961,91 and otherwise meets all the attributes of
a state under international law.92
Alternatively, President Hussein could argue that even if
Kuwait was an independent state prior to August 2, it ceased
being so after that date as a result of the Iraqi annexation, a fact
which gave Iraq the authority to deal with Kuwait as though it
were part of Iraq. A similar argument was made by Nazi officials
at Nuremberg in response to accusations of German war crimes
against civilians in occupied territories.9 This argument was re-
jected at Nuremberg ("[this] doctrine was never considered to
be applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempt-
ing to restore the occupied countries to their true owners"),94
has subsequently been rejected by the international commu-
88. Id.
89. See Philip Shenon, Iraq Sets Oil Refineries Afire As Allies Step Up Air At-
tacks, Missile Pierces Tel Aviv Shield, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1991, at Al.
90. See The 'spoils' of war: Damaged Economics ... Devastated ecologies: After-
math of the Persian Gulf War, 28 U.N. Chron. 16, 17 (1991).
91. Id. at 17.
92. Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or
has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 4, § 201.
Kuwait satisfies each of these criteria. Furthermore, Kuwait is a voting member of
the United Nations and only states are accorded such privileges. See U.N. CHARTER art.
4.
93. The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 130 (1946).
94. Id.
19921 399
BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
nity 5 and thus would be rejected in the event Hussein asserted
it as a defense with respect to his actions in Kuwait.
The provisions in Article 6(c) regarding the "enslavement
• .. and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population before or during the war" have also been violated as
a result of President Hussein's taking of Western citizens as hos-
tages following the August 2 invasion of Kuwait." The action
was justified on the ground that the hostages were needed in or-
der to protect Iraq from a military attack by the West.97 In the
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic Staff in Teheran,"
Iran seized and held as hostages members of the United States
diplomatic and consular staff and two private United States cit-
izens.90 Iran justified its actions on its belief that the United
States had engaged in criminal activities against Iran and its cit-
izens during the twenty-five years prior to the hostage taking.100
The ICJ rejected Iran's defense and held that its taking of hos-
tages was a violation of international law.10 Similarly, President
Hussein's seizing and holding of Western hostages was a viola-
tion of international law and could not be justified on the
ground of self-protection.
A very strong case can be made that Iraqi President Hus-
sein has engaged in war crimes as a result of his invasion of Ku-
wait and subsequent attacks on Israel. Furthermore, war crimes
were committed against both fighting men and civilians in order
to further President Hussein's war objectives. However, Presi-
dent Hussein may not have been alone in the commission of war
crimes. War crimes may also have been committed by President
George Bush.
95. See Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions And Cooperation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
("... No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force ... shall be
recognized as legal . . .")
96. Citizens of Italy, West Germany, Japan, France, Ireland, Greece, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Australia, Denmark and Belgium were held as hostages. See Confrontation
in the Gulf: Foreigners Will Share the Hardships, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1990, § 1, at 1.
97. See Iraqi Remarks on Detention of Foreigners, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug, 19, 1990, at
All.
98. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S.
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3.
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 38.
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IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CHARTER TO UNITED
STATES PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
In this section, President George Bush's liability under Arti-
cle 6 of the Charter and possible defenses he may assert will be
analyzed on his behalf.
The most serious war crime allegation against Bush is that
the 43-day bombing of Iraq was a "wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military neces-
sity." 102 The results of this bombing, according to a United Na-
tions report, has left Iraq in a "near apocalyptic" state.10 3 The
report found that the bombing resulted in the almost complete
destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, electrical plants, oil refin-
eries, transportation networks and approximately 9,000 Iraqi
homes, leaving 72,000 Iraqi citizens homeless.104 The report went
on to say that "most means of modern life support have been
destroyed or rendered tenuous" and warned that for "some time
to come" Iraq has been "relegated to a pre-industrial age but
with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an in-
tensive use of energy and technology."'0 5
President Bush, of course, would assert that the extensive
damage inflicted on Iraq was justified by military necessity. He
has asserted in the past that the 43-day bombing was aimed at
Iraq's offensive military capabilities and that any damage to
Iraq's cities was unintentional and merely "collateral." Evidence
obtained following the war, however, appears to contradict
Bush's assertion. A Washington Post reporter 0 6 recently uncov-
ered the following evidence:
(1) Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed pri-
marily to create postwar leverage over Iraq. Planners now say
their intent was to destroy or damage valuable facilities that
Iraq could not repair without foreign assistance.
(2) Many of the targets in Iraq's Mesopotamian heartland, the
list of which grew from about 400 to more than 700 in the war,
were chosen in the hope that the bombing would amplify the
economic and psychological impact of sanctions on Iraqi
society.
102. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, at Art. VI.
103. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Survey calls Iraq's War Damage Near-Apocalyptic, N.Y.
Tmns, Mar. 22, 1991, at Al.
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(3) Damage to civilian structures was deliberately done to
cause great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an indus-
trial society. Among the justifications offered for this damage is
that the Iraqi civilians were not blameless for the invasion of
Kuwait.10 7
This evidence, if true, contradicts any assertion of military ne-
cessity and would constitute the strongest evidence of war
crimes by Bush.
An allegation can also be made that President Bush
planned and prepared a war of aggression against Iraq in viola-
tion of Article 6(a) of the Charter.10 The clearest evidence that
President Bush planned and prepared a war occurred on No-
vember 8, 1990, when he announced that the number of United
States troops, stationed in Saudi Arabia shortly after the Iraqi
invasion for the sole purpose of deterring an Iraqi attack, would
be substantially increased and shifted to an offensive force:
"I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the
size of the United States forces committed to Desert Shield to
ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military op-
tion should that be necessary to achieve our common goals." 109,
Further evidence of war planning and preparation would be
President Bush's numerous declarations that Iraq would be at-
107. See Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Ac-
knowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, WASH. POST, June 23, 1991,
at Al.
108. It has also been suggested that President Bush violated Article 6(a) in that he
waged a war against Iraq in violation of both Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Also
known as the "Pact of Paris" or the "Kellogg-Briand Pact"). Article 2(4) has been dis-
cussed in Note 55. The pertinent provisions of the Treaty are as follows:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their rela-
tions with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all dis-
putes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
(Both the United States and Iraq are parties to this Treaty.) See 46 Stat. 2343, 94
L.N.T.S. 57 (1929).
It is unlikely, however, that President Bush would be liable under either the United
Nations Charter or the Treaty, given the fact that the use of force had been authorized
by the United Nations.
109. See Michael R. Gordon, Bush Sends New Units To Gulf To Provide 'Offensive'
Option; U.S. Forces Could Reach 380,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at Al.
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tacked if it did not withdraw its forces from Kuwait. 110 These
events occurred prior to the United Nations authorization to use
force, 1 and as a result, President Bush could not claim that he
was acting under the authority of the United Nations when
these actions were taken.
President Bush's strongest defense to the planning and
preparation allegation is that the United States troops were con-
verted from a defensive posture to an offensive posture only as a
compliment to the other Security Council resolution which had
been passed."' Further, President Bush could argue that he had
no intention of using force against Iraq without first obtaining
Security Council support. This argument is buttressed by the
fact that President Bush never acted unilaterally throughout the
crisis, always acting instead through the auspicies of the United
Nations.
President Bush could also assert two internationally recog-
nized defenses to the charge that he planned and prepared a war
of aggression against Iraq. First, he could assert that the United
States had a right to come to the aid of Kuwait following Iraq's
attack. This is known in international law as collective self-de-
fense and is permissible under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. 13 There are two conditions which must be satisfied
before states are allowed to act in self-defense: one, there must
be a necessity to do so, which means that peaceful alternatives
have either been exhausted or they clearly would be futile; and
two, acts done in self-defense must be proportional, i.e., acts
done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the ne-
cessity provoking them.""
The key issue in assessing self-defense is whether the neces-
sity requirement has been satisfied. For instance, in the Case
110. These declarations began with President Bush's statement on August 5, 1990,
"This will not Stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait," and continued
throughout the crisis. See Thomas L. Friedman, Bush, Hinting Force, Declares Iraqi
Assault 'Will Not Stand;' Proxy in Kuwait Issues Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, at
Al.
111. On November 29, 1990, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use
of force against Iraq. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 52, at 1317-18.
112. See U.N. Security Council Resolutions 661, 666 and 674, reprinted in CARTER
& TRIMBLE, supra note 52, at 1308-14.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. LI.
114. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States To Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 1620, 1635-38 (1984) [hereinafter Schachter].
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Concerning United States Diplomatic Staff in Teheran,'" the
United States, in response to Iran's seizure of United States citi-
zens as hostages, attempted to rescue them through the use of
force, several months after the initial seizure took place."' This
rescue mission occurred only after the protracted efforts of in-
termediaries and of the United Nations had produced no signifi-
cant change in the Iranian position,1 7 and after verbal threats
and attacks against the hostages were exercised by emotional
militants.118 Although the issue has never been adjudicated in an
international tribunal, 119 many international law scholars believe
that the use of force in self-defense by the United States in this
instance satisfied the necessity requirement and thus, was lawful
since it had exhausted most of the peaceful alternatives and the
hostages appeared to be in imminent danger. 120
In President Bush's case, the key issue is also whether there
was a necessity to plan and prepare a war in self-defense. Inter-
national law is clear that had the United States gone to the aid
of Kuwait during or shortly after the Iraqi attack, its actions
would have satisfied the necessity requirement and would have
been lawful. However, because the decision to convert the
United States troops to an offensive posture did not occur until
well after Iraq had succeeded in capturing Kuwait, President
Bush was required to seek peaceful alternatives, if any were
available in order to satisfy the necessity requirement.' 2 '
One peaceful alternative which was available was economic
sanctions. The international community had imposed economic
sanctions on Iraq following its attack on Kuwait. 22 Significant
evidence existed indicating that sanctions were likely to force
115. 1980 I.C.J. 3.
116. Id. at 17.
117. Some of those efforts included: one, a Security Council resolution calling on
Iran to release the hostages, id. at 16; two, the December 15, 1979 order of the ICJ call-
ing for the release of the hostages, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Con-
sular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J.; three, the establishment of a U.N. fact
finding commission, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 20.
118. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Help in International Law: U.S. Action in the Ira-
nian Hostages Crisis, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 231, 244 (1984) [hereinafter Schachter, Self-Help].
119. The legal issues concerning the rescue mission were discussed briefly by the
ICJ, but left undecided, since the issue of the mission's legality was never put before it.
Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 43-44.
120. See, e.g., Schachter, Self-Help, supra note 118, at 244.
121. See Schachter, supra note 114, at 1636.




Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. For instance, a study conducted
prior to the war indicated that virtually 100 percent of Iraq's
trade and financial relations were subject to sanctions.12 3 The re-
sulting loss of 48 percent of Iraq's Gross National Product would
have been twenty times the average economic impact in other
successful episodes of sanctions and three times the previous
highest cost imposed on any target country. 24 Far from incon-
clusive, the study suggested that sanctions had a high
probability of forcing Iraq from. Kuwait as early as the fall of
1991.125 In addition to the study, several defense experts, 126 in-
cluding President Bush's own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Colin Powell, believed that sanctions would be successful
in forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait.127 Despite this strong evidence
that sanctions were likely to force Iraq to withdraw from Ku-
wait, President Bush opted for war instead of affording the sanc-
tions an opportunity to work. Although President Bush would
obviously contest the study, his claim of self-defense to the
charge of planning and preparing aggressive war is not a legal
certainty.
A second internationally recognized defense which Presi-
dent Bush could assert would be humanitarian intervention. Hu-
manitarian intervention is controversial and involves actions by
an outside state in order to prevent large-scale atrocities or
acute deprivation by another state. President Bush could argue
that any war planning or preparation which he engaged in oc-
curred in response to the Iraqi atrocities against the Kuwaiti
people.'
Humanitarian intervention by an outside state has generally
been accepted by the international community where its purpose
is to assist that state's citizens and not a pretext for other illegit-
123. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Kimberly A. Elliott, Sanctions Will Bite - and Soon,
N.Y. Tms, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. United States defense experts who believed that sanctions would have been
effective in forcing Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait include former Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe and Gen. David Jones, and former
Defense Secretaries Robert L. McNamara, Frank C. Carlucci, Caspar W. Weinberger,
Elliot L. Richardson and James L. Schlesinger. See Michael R. Gordon, Ex-Defense Sec-
retaries Advise Patience in Gulf, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1990, at A14; Michael R. Gordon, 2
Ex-Military Chiefs Urge Bush to Delay Gulf War, N.Y. Tnhms, Nov. 29, 1990, at Al.
127. The views of Chairman Powell are contained in Bob Woodward's recent book,
The Commanders. BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 299-303 (1991).
128. See supra note 94.
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imate purposes. An excellent illustration of the type of humani-
tarian intervention considered acceptable by many in the inter-
national community is the Israeli rescue at Entebbe, Uganda in
1976. While on a journey from Israel, via Athens, to Paris, an Air
France aircraft carrying over 200 passengers was hijacked by a
group of terrorists who had boarded it at Athens. 29 Having been
denied landing rights in Libya, the plane was diverted to
Uganda and landed at Entebbe.130 After some delay, the ter-
rorists demanded the release of more than 50 detainees of sev-
eral countries, the majority of whom were Palestinian prisoners
held by Israel. 131
After the intervention of Ugandan President Idi Amin, the
hijackers agreed to release most of their hostages, except those
possessing Israeli or dual nationality.1 3 2 The Israeli Government,
breaking with its declared policies, announced a willingness to
negotiate the release of some of the detainees in exchange for
the safety of the remaining hostages.133 In response, the hijack-
ers increased their demands. 34 Finally, less than twenty-four
hours before the expiration of the time limit set by the hijackers,
three Israeli aircraft landed at Entebbe and after an exchange of
fire, most of the hostages were airlifted to safety.135 The Israeli
actions were generally regarded as lawful by the international
community, since they were taken in order to prevent a large
number of atrocities against Israeli citizens and Israel did not
have any other purpose for infringing on Uganda's
sovereignty. 36
Humanitarian intervention by an outside state has been fre-
quently rejected, however, where the purpose of the action has
been to prevent atrocities by a state against its own citizens. 37
For instance, after the Khmer Rouge political party came to
power in Cambodia, it "began to remake Cambodian society by
emptying the cities and destroying anything and anybody associ-
129. See Leslie C. Green, Rescue at Entebbe - Legal Aspects, 6 IsR. Y.B. H.R. 312,
314 (1976).





135. Id. at 315.
136. See Schachter, supra note 114, at 1629-30.
137. The United Nations, on the other hand, would have the authority to act in
such a situation pursuant to Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.
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ated with the previous regime, with the West and, in due course,
with Vietnam."13 The Khmer Rouge engaged in numerous
atrocities. 139 It is estimated that approximately two million
Cambodians, a quarter of the entire population, were killed by
the Khmer Rouge. 140 Despite these tremendous human rights
abuses, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, which consisted of
an invasion and occupation, has consistently been rejected by
the United Nations General Assembly by large and increasing
majorities . 4 1 Furthermore, similar interventions have also been
rejected by the international community. 42 Since the interna-
tional community has generally rejected humanitarian interven-
tion except in cases involving the intervening states' own citi-
zens, President Bush's actions in planning and preparing a war
against Iraq prior to obtaining United Nations authorization,
even if motivated by humanitarian concerns, may not have been
a justification for doing so.
An allegation can also be made that President Bush com-
mitted crimes against humanity in violation of Article 6(c) of the
Charter as a result of the February 13, 1991 bombing of Iraq.
138. See GARY KLINTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 6 (1989).
139. These atrocities included:
-the termination of a large number of ethnic minorities;
-the elimination of all officers, soldiers and civil servants of the former ad-
ministration, together with their families;
-the killing of those opposed to the regime, or likely to oppose it;
-the establishment of a repressive and coercive system of communes in which
people were forced to work until exhausted and were reduced to conditions
akin to slavery;
-the use of a network of secret informers;
-the abolition of traditional family and other relationships;
-the extermination of Buddhists, intellectuals, educated people and
technicians;
-the use of the most savage methods to torture and kill to extract confessions;
-the abolition of religious freedom and education at all levels.
Id. at 60-61.
140. Id. at 7.
141. G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 48, at 2-5, Press Release GA/ 6546 (1981);
G.A. Res. 35/6, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 48, at 3-5. Press Release GA/6375 (1980); G.A.
Res. 34/22 U.N. Doc. A/34/L. 13/Rev. 2 (1979). It should be pointed out, however, that
although the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge were considered by the United Nations when
these resolutions were enacted, Vietnam has never actually asserted it as a defense.
142. India justified its 1971 invasion of Pakistan on reports it had received of wide-
spread Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis in East Pakistan. Despite the international
community's sympathy for the Bengalis, the United Nations General Assembly called on
India to withdraw its forces. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 29, at 3,
U.N. Doc. A Res./2793 (XXVI) (1971).
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The United States bombing resulted in the death of several hun-
dred Iraqi civilians. 143 The Iraqis claimed that the civilians were
being housed in a civilian bomb shelter and that no military
equipment was present at the facility and that the United States
was aware of these facts.14 4 The United States, on the other
hand, contends that the facility was used as a command and
control center by the Iraqi military and that it had no knowl-
edge that civilians were being housed in the facility.145 If the
United States is correct, then President Bush obviously has not
committed any war crimes. However, if the Iraqis are correct,
President Bush has committed crimes against humanity in viola-
tion of Article 6(c) of the Charter. The available evidence, how-
ever, is too inconclusive to reach any conclusions regarding Pres-
ident Bush's liability at this time. Furthermore, the discussion
of President Bush's liability is purely academic, given the fact
that even if a war crimes tribunal is convened, it is unlikely that
he would be the subject of any charges at such a tribunal.
V. THE FAILURES OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL AND THE NEED
TO CREATE A PERMANENT WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
The Nuremberg Tribunal was a noble attempt to punish
war makers and those who failed to adhere to the rules of war-
fare. However, one of the biggest failures of Nuremberg was the
fact that possible Allied war crimes were overlooked. Some be-
lieve, for instance, that the Allies committed war crimes as a re-
sult of their February 13-15, 1945, bombing of the East German
city of Dresden. The following is an eyewitness description of
the bombing:
In the late hours of 13 February, strong Anglo-American
bomber forces bombed the centre of the city [Dresden] on both
sides of the Elbe and also the encircling ring of residential
streets, and reduced them to blazing ruins. What had stood
there previously can be seen on any map of the city printed in
1944: dwelling houses, streets of shops, a few dozen public
buildings ... That evening there must have been one billion
143. See Alessandra Stanley, Iraq Says United States Killed Hundreds Of Civilians
At Shelter, But Allies Call It Military Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, at Al.
144. Id.
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souls within the city: several hundred thousand bombed-out
people and refugees from the two neighboring Silesian prov-
inces in addition to the 600,000 population. Sheets of flame
consumed the narrow, closely-built streets, where many people
found a quick death from lack of oxygen. At midnight a second
enemy air fleet appeared in the red sky of the Elbe valley and
bombed the masses of people who fled to the green, open
spaces in a way that no one but Ilya, Ehrenburg could con-
ceive. Twelve hours later, on Wednesday, when the sirens were
out of action, a third attack laid a fresh belt of destruction
upon the periphery of the city where the streams of homeless
humanity might be expected to be. And on the following day,
at midday again, enemy formations bombed the villages fur-
ther along the Elbe valley where the long columns of refugees
were seeking shelter."'
The bombing of Dresden occurred shortly before the end of
the war. It resulted in the death of approximately 25,000 Ger-
man civilians. 147 Many believe that the bombing constituted a
war crime because it occurred after the Germans, for all practi-
cal purposes, had been defeated and thus was unnecessary. 148
Another example of possible Allied war crimes was the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 6, 1945, the
United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of
Hiroshima.14 This bombing resulted in 70,000 to 80,000 civilians
being killed or missing and presumed dead and an equal number
being injured.1 50 In addition, a substantial number of buildings
and factories were destroyed.' 5' Three days later, the United
States dropped another atomic bomb on the Japanese city of
Nagasaki. 52 This bombing resulted in 35,000 to 40,000 civilians
being killed or missing and presumed dead and an equal number
being injured.15 3
The United States has consistently asserted that the bomb-
ing occurred "in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to
save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Ameri-
146. See ALEXANDER McKEE, DRESDEN 1945: THE DEVIL's TINDERBOX 268 (1984).
147. Id. at 274.
148. Id. at 262-77.
149. See P.M.S. BLACKErT, FEAR, WAR, AND THE BoMB 39 (1949).
150. Id. at 40.
151. Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Id.
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cans." 4 This contention has been rejected by many after criti-
cal historical study.155 Rather, these scholars suggest that the de-
cision to use atomic weapons against Japan was motivated by
super-power politics, rather than a desire to save American
lives.1 6 According to these scholars, the United States' desire
was to significantly weaken Japan before the Soviet entry into
the war so that America would be in complete control of Japan
and would not have to compete against the Soviets for author-
ity.1 57 If the historians are accurate, the United States bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have constituted a war crime.
The discussion of the bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima, and
Nagasaki helps to illustrate Nuremberg's major flaw, that only
the vanquished were prosecuted for war crimes, while the victors
were able to avoid prosecution. That this was allowed to occur
contravenes the purpose of any war crimes tribunal, which is to
deter war making and to punish those who conduct war in an
inhumane manner. Moreover, the failure to prosecute the victors
further divides the powerful nations of the world from those not
so powerful by insulating the powerful from prosecution. Before
any future war crimes tribunal is convened, this flaw must be
corrected.
The best way to do so is to create a permanent war crimes
tribunal. In order to ensure its success, states must be assured of
the tribunal's neutrality and detachment. To this end, the stat-
ute creating the tribunal must contain three important provi-
sions. First, the defendants who appear before the tribunal must
be assured of a fair trial. 58 To this end, the judges who sit on
the tribunal must be diverse and chosen in a democratic man-
ner. The ICJ's process for selecting judges would be adequate. 15
Second, unlike the ICJ, a permanent war crimes tribunal cannot
wait until cases are submitted to it. Rather, this tribunal must
have an investigatory and prosecutorial component. This provi-
sion is essential and would be the best way of ensuring that war
crimes of both victors and vanquished are investigated and pros-
154. Id. at 128.
155. Id. at 132-43.
156. Id. at 137.
157. Id.
158. One can seriously question whether the accused at Nuremberg received a fair
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ecuted. Finally, a permanent tribunal must have subpoena pow-
ers and the power to require the extradition of any alleged war
criminal residing in the territory of a United Nations member.
The final provision is probably the most controversial and
raises an important- issue: What happens in the event that a
United Nations member refuses to extradite an alleged war
criminal residing in its territory? It is inconceivable, for in-
stance, that Iraq would extradite President Hussein at the pre-
sent time or that the United States would extradite President
Bush. In this situation, the Security Council does have the au-
thority, pursuant to Articles 39 and 42 of the United Nations
Charter, to obtain custody of an alleged war criminal. However,
the use of Article 42, which authorizes force to carry out Secur-
ity Council decisions, would be inappropriate. The use of force
in this situation would be inconsistent with the purposes of the
permanent tribunal and should only be used in exceptional cir-
cumstances. Rather, the use of economic sanctions, which the
Security Council can impose pursuant to Article 41, is a more
attractive alternative.
There are certain to be other objections to the creation of a
permanent tribunal as proposed in this paper. These include ob-
jections that are likely to be raised by Western nations and
Israel, since they are most likely to be affected by such a tribu-
nal. These nations have, until very recently, believed that there
is an anti-Western and anti-Israeli bias in the United Nations
and these biases are likely to be carried over to a permanent war
crimes tribunal, resulting in the selective prosecution of Western
nations and Israel.
The concerns of Western nations and Israel are understand-
able. However, recent events suggest that any anti-Western and
anti-Israeli biases which may have existed in the past have di-
minished considerably. An illustration would be the recent expe-
rience of the United States in the United Nations throughout
the Gulf crisis. A further illustration would be the agreement by
Arab nations to participate in a peace conference with Israel.
Another likely objection to the proposed tribunal is its se-
lection process for judges, which would emulate the ICJ process.
This objection is based on the alleged biases of the judges who
sit on the ICJ. There are those who believe that these biases
were particularly apparent in the Nicaragua v. United States
1992]
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casel e and to permit the permanent tribunal to select judges in
a similar manner as the ICJ is unacceptable.
The ICJ justices are no more biased than judges who sit on
any other tribunal. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. This
is reflected in the fact that most Western nations have submit-
ted to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. 6' Further, an increas-
ing number of third world nations have recently brought cases
before the ICJ, despite what they have perceived to be an his-
toric pro-Western bias on the part of the ICJ.162 Finally, those
who argue that the ICJ's decision in the Nicaragua case reflects
the court's biases overlook the fact that the judgment in that
case was 12 to 3, with a substantial number of Western and non-
Western judges in the majority.16 3
The success of any permanent war crimes tribunal will re-
quire the participation of powerful nations. To this end, it may
be necessary to make certain concessions, such as subjecting
some of the tribunal's final decisions to Security Council ap-
proval.16 4 Such a concession might diminish the primary purpose
of a permanent tribunal. However, it is hoped that the decisions
of the tribunal, even if vetoed by a permanent member of the
Security Council, would have moral suasion with the individual
and nation affected and within the international community.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the case against Presidents Hus-
sein and Bush in the event a war crimes tribunal is commenced.
The case was based solely on news reports before, during and
after the war, since the author did not have access to either mili-
tary and political leaders or classified military documents. For
160. Case Concerning Military Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). For criticism of the Court's decision, see James
P. Rowles, Nicaragua versus the United States: Issues of Law and Policy, 20 INT'L LAW.
1245, 1281-1284 (1986).
161. The following Western nations have either accepted compulsory jurisdiction or
have been a party before the Court: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United
States.
162. See Edward McWhinney, Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures and the
International Court of Justice, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 873 (1987).
163. Nicaragua, 1986 LC.J. at 14.
164. For instance, the decision to seek extradition of an alleged war criminal could
be subject to Security Council approval.
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this reason, the author would caution readers against forming
any firm conclusions regarding either party's liability. Only a
war crimes tribunal, created in a manner outlined in this paper,
can definitively determine the liability issue.

